Editorials of The Times

Unsatisfied with mere terrestrial disruption, or maybe just eager to change the subject yet again, President Donald Trump recently seized on outer space, blindsiding the Pentagon with a directive to create a sixth branch of the military called the Space Force.

Social media and late-night comedians pounced on the proposal, announced at the White House last month; “The Daily Show” interviewed Trump supporters who extolled the benefits of such a force while voicing confused explanations for why it might be needed — to fight terrorist drones in outer space, for instance.

They can hardly be faulted. As usual, Trump had few details at hand, including what the new military service, separate from but equal to the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard, would do. Would it station troops in orbit? And how would it relate to a broader national (celestial?) security strategy?

Trump is right to call attention to this vulnerability and defend U.S. interests. But his aggressive ambitions — with talk of “dominance in space” and space being a “war-fighting domain” like the land, sea and air — could spur an arms race in space and make war-fighting there more likely.

Congress is making the situation worse by ordering the Pentagon, in the 2019 defense bill, to begin work on a space-based missile interceptor that experts say is provocative, technically infeasible and prohibitively expensive.

Not long ago, national leaders and scientists, if not Hollywood producers, saw space as a horizon for scientific exploration rather than for intergalactic battles. In 1967, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and other countries ratified an international treaty legally binding them to use outer space for peaceful purposes.

Since then, space has become increasingly contested, jeopardizing the security of thousands of satellites that enable the Pentagon to locate enemies on the battlefield, verify arms control treaties and ensure an early warning if an adversary targets the country with an intercontinental ballistic missile. They guide aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, drones in the skies over Yemen and fighter jets over Syria.

Many nations have valuable assets in orbit, but America has long dominated space and is most at risk if an adversary decides to knock out those satellites. Everything from the control of nuclear weapons to weather forecasting to cellphones could be affected, and officials admit that the United States is not adequately prepared for such a fight.

During the Cold War, the United States and Russia engaged in limited testing of anti-satellite weapons. Now China, and to a lesser extent Russia, are pursuing such offensive capabilities. The tide turned in 2007 when China conducted its first successful anti-satellite test by blowing up one of its own weather satellites. In February, a U.S. intelligence assessment warned that Russia and China would be able to shoot down U.S. satellites in two years.

Critics say the Air Force doesn’t pay enough attention to these matters because it is more worried about pilots and planes. With the Pentagon’s space-related activities dispersed among 60 agencies, some consolidation may be needed to eliminate inefficiency and focus on the true challenges in space. In fact, Congress had ordered the Pentagon to study that question; Trump pre-empted the results of that inquiry, which are due to be released next month.

Rather than leaping to a vast new military bureaucracy, Trump might consider starting with a precise understanding of what is needed for improved space defense. Does the Pentagon need to do a better job of buying satellites and harmonizing the assets among the military services? Of building satellites that are more resilient? Is space truly the future of U.S. power projection, even warfare, and does that mean we need new weapons and forces?

Regardless, one major element clearly missing from Trump’s initiative is diplomacy that can make star wars less likely. China and Russia have proposed a legally binding treaty that would ban the use of force or weapons in space. But many experts consider such a pact unverifiable or even naïve, given how aggressively both countries are developing their own capabilities.

A more plausible course would be for China and Russia to work with the United States and the European Union to establish norms for responsible behavior in space, including not testing anti-satellite weapons.

The Obama administration left the Europeans in charge of drafting such standards, but that effort, while helpful, came to naught. For any truly constructive result, the United States must lead, regardless of Trump’s disdain for multilateral negotiations.

Other lower-level channels could provide the United States, Russia and China with a chance to discuss space cooperation. One is a U.N. group; another is the Commerce Department, which has been asked to manage satellites and debris in space.

Trump, and many experts, seem to assume that war in space is likely, if not inevitable. But despite their aggressive behavior, China and Russia also depend on access to space and should have an interest in avoiding conflict. Whatever happens to the Space Force proposal, Trump ought to be thinking bigger — about how the United States can help preserve outer space as a global commons, free of conflict and open to exploration by all space-faring nations.